A User-Centric Approach for Secured eDocument Transmission: Digital Signing Practical Issues and the eCert Solution by Chen-Wilson, Lisha et al.
A User-Centric Approach for Secured eDocument Transmission:   
Digital Signing Practical Issues and the eCert Solution 
 
 
Lisha Chen-Wilson, Lester Gilbert, Gary B Wills, Andrew M Gravell, David Argles 
Learning Societies Lab, School of Electronic and Computer Science, University of 
Southampton, United kingdom 
{lcw07r, lg3, gbw, amg, da}@ecs.soton.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Digital signing is commonly used in eDocument 
security, but does not address all requirements such 
as  fine-grained  access  control  and  content  status 
validation.    A  system  for  distributing  electronic 
educational certificates (eCertificates) is used as a 
case study in the eCert project.  This paper describes 
the issues, identifies the required use cases, explores 
the gap between current techniques and the desired 
system,  and  presents  a  design  which  meets  the 
requirements.    A  preliminary  implementation 
confirms that the design is a sound one, and can be 
used  to  solve  digital  signing  issues  in  related 
scenarios  such  as  mobile  IDs  and  healthcare 
records. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
As  digital  technologies  continue  to  develop 
rapidly, they impact on many daily tasks which rely 
on technology.  Many of our paper-based documents 
are  being  gradually  replaced  by  their  electronic 
versions,  such  as  eTickets,  email,  online  banking, 
and  ePortfolios.    These  technologies  are  powerful, 
flexible, and bring huge advantages.  However, when 
we  come  to  transfer  digital  data  between  three  or 
more unknown parties, there exists a major security 
issue:  
  how  can  the  receiver  believe  that  the  data  is 
from the expected person,  
  that it has not been modified in any way; 
  how can the sender ensure that  their data  will 
not be misused? 
Example  1,  An  electronic  version  of  a 
qualification  certificate  (eCertificate):  An 
eCertificate will be issued to a learner by an exam 
board,  and  then  further  distributed  to  selected 
reviewers by the learner.  While forged certificates 
exist in paper-based certificate systems, this problem 
also exists in the electronic version of certificates as 
digital documents can easily be copied and modified.   
Example 2, Mobile IDs: The traditional method 
of proving your age, vocation, or skills are by using 
all  sorts  of  ID  cards,  such  as  citizen  card,  student 
card,  and  driving  license.    It  would  be  nice  if  we 
could  integrate  all  these  required  proof  documents 
into  our  mobile  phone,  letting  it  become  the  only 
device  that  we  may  need  to  carry  when  we  leave 
home.   However, we are facing security issues, such 
as  how  can  we  let  the  doorman  at  a  night  club 
believe  that  the  age  proving  eDocument  on  the 
mobile  truly  belongs  to  you,  is  issued  from  the 
expected authority, and has not been modified since? 
Example  3,  Sharing  Healthcare  Records: 
Increasingly  medical  records  are  being  stored 
electronically.    This  creates  potential  problems  for 
patients,  doctors  and  clinicians  who  may  need  to 
provide partial or time-limited access to third parties 
such  as  third  party  health  providers  and  medical 
insurance  companies.    As  with  any  eDocument, 
validation is essential, but it is also paramount that 
patient  confidentiality  is  not  violated,  and  that 
embarrassing  private  information  cannot  be 
forwarded  to  potentially  malicious  agents  such  as 
newspapers.       
The  common  problems:  There  are  many 
similarities  scenarios  between  these  three  cases.  
They  represent  a  common  situation  where 
authentication of data is required when transmitting 
between two or more, but not always known, parties.  
They both involve trust between three stakeholders: 
the eDocument issuer, the owner and the reviewer.  
  The reviewer needs to trust that the eDocument 
belongs to the claimed person, is issued from a 
trusted body, and hasn’t been modified since it 
was issued; needs to trust the issuer and the 
verification system being used 
  The eDocument owner needs to trust the 
received eDocument as being truly from the 
expected issuer; trust the reviewer not to further 
distribute or misuse the information  
  The issuer needs to trust the identity information 
provided by the applicant (the owner) before the 
eDocument can be issued; trust the reviewer not 
to perform any unauthorized action while 
opening the channel to the backend database 
during verification process. 
To  satisfy  the  trust,  we  need  to  address  the 
security requirements:    Confidentiality: only the specified person should 
be able to access it;  
  Privacy:  owner  should  retain  control  over  the 
distributed eDocument;  
  Integrity:  no  unauthorized  modification  should 
be allowed;  
  Authentication: self-validating, can be verified; 
Identity: proof of ownership, and you are  who 
you claim to be;  
  Status  validation:  it  should  be  possible  to 
withdraw  certification  after  issue  of  the 
eCertificate;  
  Lifetime validation: would remain valid even if 
the issuing authority no longer exists;  
  Trustworthiness:  issuer can be tracked down to 
a trusted authority. 
 
2.  Limitation of digital signing 
 
Digital signing is an efficient  way to prove the 
issue,  and  prevent  modification,  of  an  eDocument, 
and therefore it is currently used as the eDocument 
security  method.    However,  it  is  suited  to  static 
documents,  but  not  to  documents  with  changing 
status:       
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The e-document itself could  also be a 
certificate (e.g. a birth certificate or a 
qualification award certificate), which 
may be revoked in a later stage (e.g. 
for a qualification certificate, if 
discovered, after the certificate has 
been issued, to have cheated in exam 
or to have plagiarized).  
The signer’s public 
key certificate may 
be withdraw if the 
private key has been 
compromised 
The digitally 
signed document 
will have its 
content 
modification 
verified, but it 
won’t have the 
content validation 
checked.  For an e-
certificate, this is a 
critical security 
hole as the e-
certificate will be 
passed the 
verification 
process even it 
has been 
withdrawn. 
Current PKI has a 
known security hole: 
it uses the keys to 
verify the 
modification of the 
document, but it only 
start the validation 
process for the 
public key 
certificates’ status 
when it is required by 
the receiver.  For an 
e-certificate, this may 
result in a forgery 
being accepted if the 
issuer’s key has been 
compromised, but 
the receiver didn’t 
request the check.  
This required the receiver of the digitally signed document to have 
   - software support to handle the verify process – one for each issuer
   - relevant IT skill to manage to the operation, especially for the first time if system set up is required
 
Figure 1. Issues when applying digital signing Content validation: a digitally signed document 
can  have  its  modification,  signer,  and  the  signer’s 
CA validated, but not the content of the document. 
This  is  crucial  to  an  eCertificate  as  this  signed 
document itself is also a certificate, which may have 
a  period  of  validity  (e.g.  first  aid  certificate),  and 
may  be  revoked  at  a  later  stage  (e.g.  if  it  is 
discovered, after the certificate has been issued, that 
the  person  has  cheated  in  an  exam  or  have 
plagiarized). The problem we are dealing with is a 
certificate-squared,  or  (certificate)
2,  issue,  which 
involves  the  issuer’s  public  key  certificate  and  the 
qualification certificate as a whole.  
Auto request of validation: Current Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) doesn’t start the validation of the 
public key certificates’ status automatically.  It will 
only process if required.  In the case of eCertificate, 
this is a critical security hole as it may result in a 
forgery  being  accepted  if  the  key  has  been 
compromised.  
These  issues  are  shown  diagrammatically  in 
Figure1. 
 
3.  Issues when applying digital signing 
 
When  we  need  to  forward  a  digitally  signed 
eDocument,  the  trust  and  key  management  issues 
become complicated. 
 
3.1. Digital  signing  with  independently 
distribute approach 
 
If we use a digitally signed document to replace 
the paper-based document within the existing issue, 
distribution, and verification process path, e.g. from 
institution to learner, then learner to reviewer, this 
raises  service  support  and  privacy  issues.    It  will 
require all the receivers (the eDocument owner and 
all reviewers) to have service support to handle the 
verification process on reception; once the reviewer 
has  access  to  one  document,  they  can  access  any 
documents that are signed in the same way.  This is 
against  confidentiality  and  privacy  requirement  in 
some situations. 
 
3.2. Digital  signing  with  individual 
institutional approach 
 
As  digitally  signed  documents  require  service 
support  and  key  management  for  forward 
distribution, an institutional  approach is commonly 
used to avoid this:  
  eDocuments  will  be  issued  and  stored  in  the 
institution’s system;  
  the  system  will  also  provide  management  and 
verification service;  
  eDocument owners can access the system to set 
access control of their own  eDocument before 
sending  out  the  links  and  access  keys  to  the 
specified reviewers;  
  the reviewers can access the system to view and 
verify  the  eDocuments  through  the  provided 
links and access keys 
An  institutional  approach  can  overcome  the 
service support issue as it provides the management 
and verification services within the institution.  It can 
also address the privacy and confidentiality issues by 
setting system access values.  However, other new 
issues then arise: the approach requires huge storage 
as it needs to store all the issued eDocuments for a 
lifetime;  the  support  service  provides  an  active 
channel  to  the  backend  database,  which  could 
increase the risk of attack rapidly; it is heavily reliant 
on  the  issuing  institutions,  lifetime  validation  is  a 
problem  if  the  institution  no  longer  exists;  it  is 
inconvenient  for  the  receivers  to  access  their 
eDocuments when the eDocuments are issued from 
many different institutions.  E.g. a student may need 
to log into many different institutions to access and 
manage his/her eDocuments received throughout the 
study journey.  
 
3.3. Digital  signing  with  linked  institutions 
plus central service approach 
 
Alternatively,  linked  institutions  with  a  central 
service  approach  may  be  used:  a)  a  central  online 
system  provides  the  management  and  verification 
service for all member institutions; b) all institutions 
issue eDocuments under the same standard, and then 
upload  to  the  central  system;  c)  the  owners  can 
access the online management system to set access 
control of their own eDocument before sending out 
the link and access token to the specified reviewer; 
d)the  reviewer  can  access  the  online  verification 
system through the link and use the access token to 
view, verify, and download the eDocument.  
Compared  with  the  individual  institutional 
approach,  this  approach  addresses  the  lifetime 
validation issue, and also solves the inconvenience 
problem  as  the  users  only  need  to  access  one 
reference  point  for  all  the  eDocuments.  However, 
this  approach  requires  even  bigger  storage  as  it  is 
necessary  to store all the issued eDocuments from 
the  joined  institutions  for  a  lifetime;  this  also 
increases  the  risk  of  database  attacks  as  a  bigger 
database contains  more information;  what is  more, 
who will host such a system? It must be trusted by all 
institutions  as  it  holds  the  information  for  all  of 
them. But, the UK government has a track record of 
losing our sensitive information, and in some cases, 
the whole database[1].  
 
4.  Case study – the eCert project  
 
The  problems  that  we  are  facing  need  answers.  
The eCertificate example requires digital signing for 
non  static  documents  and  forward  transfer  of  the document; it represents the typical problem situation, 
therefore, it is used as case study to research for a 
solution.  
 
4.1. Motivation  
 
The  field  of  eLearning  provides  technological 
developments, such as ePortfolios, which are being 
explored  as  an  improvement  over  paper-based 
portfolios in the job and course application process.  
However,  forged  certificates  exist  due  to  poor 
security  in  ePortfolio  systems.    Therefore,  the 
students’  claimed  achievements  within  ePortfolios 
need  to  be  verified.    Abrami[2]  notes  that  it  is 
difficult  to  authenticate  the  evidence  in  ePortfolio.  
Related work has been ongoing at the University of 
Southampton  exploring  possible  mechanisms  for 
transferable eCertificates in a user-centric context[3, 
4].    The  JISC  (Joint  Information  Systems 
Committee) is funding the project, eCert, to research 
for a potential solution, which is just what our case 
study about. 
 
4.2. Domain research 
 
The JISC eFramework has been the backbone to 
help build interoperable tools for eLearning, such as 
the ones for ePortfolios[5, 6].  It has been facilitated 
by  choosing  a  Service  Orientated  Architecture 
(SOA)[7].  The Service Orientated Reference Model 
(SORM)[8]  was  conceptualized  to  encapsulate  the 
eFramework  research  process.    The  eP4LL 
(EPortfolios  for  Lifelong  Learning)  project 
developed a reference model for ePortfolios for the 
eFramework[9].  The  RIPPLL  (Regional 
Interoperability Project on Progression for Lifelong 
Learning)  has  tackled  the  authentication  issue 
between institutions it links by using a SSO (Single-
Sign-On)  system,  where  the  identity  of  a  user  is 
supported by their home institution when accessing 
other institutions’ systems[10].  
The  main  body  of  research  into  ePortfolios  has 
been into defining reference models for the domain, 
such  that  these  can  be  developed  into  a  body  of 
interoperable reference implementation services and 
tools.  It is apparent that although the eP4LL models 
define  the  use  cases  for  the  exchange  of  portfolio 
data,  from  an  eCertificate  perspective  they  are 
limited,  as  neither  has  described  explicitly  the 
security issues raised by transmitting data between 
multiple, and not always known, parties; and there 
still is no mechanism to authenticate the veracity of 
the portfolio data transmitted between institutions in 
RIPPLL.  As Peter Rees Jones[11], an eP4LL project 
member, comments on his blog: “Security and Trust: 
the[12] Reference Model sidestepped this key issue”. 
However,  the  SORM  methodology  has  been 
identified to investigate eCertificates. 
 
4.3. Existing systems  
 
There  are  existing  systems  dealing  with  the 
authentication of qualification.  However, they were 
built for specific purposes, and couldn’t address the 
security requirements involved in data transmission 
that we noted above. For example: 
Europass: the European Community provides a 
Europass  Certificate  Supplement  and  a  Diploma 
Supplement[13].  These provide facsimiles of award 
certificates and information about the qualification.  
However,  the  system  clearly  states  that,  “The 
Europass Certificate Supplement is not: a substitute 
for the original certificate;” or “An automatic system 
that guarantees recognition”.  But, this is not good 
enough for the security in real world.   
The  Chinese  Certificate  Information 
Verification  service[14]:  The  service  will  take 
unique  student  numbers  and  unique  certificate 
numbers  as  input,  and  output  the  specified 
qualification detail along with the student’s personal 
detail, including a photo.  It provides more reliability 
to the viewers as it also verifies the identity of the 
person. But this method doesn’t suit every country, 
e.g.  it  against  the  data  protection  law  in  the  UK.  
Also, this service only verifies qualification records, 
but not eCertificates. 
Digitary  (Digital  Notary)  [15]:  the  system 
issues,  distributes  and  authenticates  eCertificates 
over  the  Internet  with  the  system  installed  to 
institutions individually.  Students need to login to 
their institution’s system to access and manage their 
eCertificates, such as set access tokens for individual 
reviewers.    Reviewers  can  then  access  the 
eCertificates  through  the  received  URLs  using  the 
access tokens; this may involve registration process 
depending on the access level that was set.  This is 
the  closest  system  to  our  idea  of  the  eCertificate, 
however,  it  uses  an  institutional  approach  when 
applying  digital  signing,  therefore,  there  exist  the 
storage,  security,  lifetime  validation,  and  usage 
issues mentioned above. 
 
4.4. Use case analysis 
 
The  eCertificate  scenarios  have  been  set  up  to 
help  with the understanding  of the  situation.  It is 
depicted in Table 1. 
The scenarios are shown diagrammatically as use 
cases  in  Figure2.  The  use  cases  indicate  that  the 
eCertificate system involves many issues during the 
processes.  These involve assertion, privacy, rights, 
stakeholder trust, and distributed stakeholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1. Use Case Scenarios 
  Scenarios and conditions  
c
r
e
a
t
e
 
 
An examination board checks that the students have 
successfully passed the particular exams, and are who they 
claim to be, and then creates the e-certificates accordingly.  -- 
This involves identification and verification against the exam 
board’s database.  The creation process needs to have 
standard control for both low and high level qualification 
certificates in order to suit educational institutions of a wild 
range.   
 
w
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
 
  An examination board found out that an e-certificate was 
miss-issued, and needs to be withdrawn.  -- This needs 
security methods to support the withdrawal mechanism 
i
s
s
u
e
 
The examination board issues the e-certificates for students.  -
- This needs security methods to a) indicate that the e-
certificates are issued by the exam board, in order to prove its 
genuineness, and prevent unauthorized editing and copying 
after issue; b) issue the e-certificates;  
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
 
The students receive their e-certificates, and view the 
contents. -- This needs security methods to ensure that no one 
other than the students themselves can view their own e-
certificates.    
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
 
 
A student specifies certain e-certificates to be visible to 
particular employers.  -- The student needs to be able to 
control which e-certificate(s) for which employer(s) and are 
for how long they would be valid.  The system design needs 
to be user friendly, suitable for users without IT skills  
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
 
 
A student sends the selected e-certificate(s)to potential 
employers  -- The student should be able to send the e-
certificate(s) alone or within an e-portfolio.  --  For students 
sending the e-certificates through e-portfolio accounts, only 
the selected e-certificate(s) in the account should be visible to 
the employer(s).  
 
r
e
v
i
e
w
 
 
An employer views the received e-certificate(s)  -- This needs 
security methods to a) ensure only the specified employer can 
view the e-certificate(s), but not anyone else; b)  protect from 
modifying and unauthorized copying.  
 
v
e
r
i
f
y
 
 
The employer verifies the received e-certificate(s) -- The 
system need to be able to verify all level qualifications that 
are issued using the same standard from any education 
institutions nationwide, and check that the e-certificate and 
the key are still valid  
 
 
 
Assertion: the system need to be self certificating 
to prove it’s genuine, and also to allow reviewers to 
further  confirm  it.    As  well  as  generating  these 
assertions, it should be possible to withdraw them.  
Parallels  can  be  drawn  with  Public  Key 
Infrastructure certificate systems, which provide the 
required method while also maintaining a revocation 
list  of  keys  which  are  invalid  as  they  have  been 
compromised[16].  
Privacy: ePortfolio reference models include the 
functionality for owners to be able to create different 
“views” where “information relevant to a particular 
purpose”  is  selected  by  the  owner  for  a  selected 
audience[12]. This means the owner can tailor their 
portfolio to best support their application. This also 
applies  to  eCertificates,  as  no  matter  whether  it  is 
used standalone or within an ePortfolio, one aim is to 
give students control over its usage  This is a similar 
paradigm to Web 2.0 social networking sites were a 
user can “categorize their network (of friends) into 
different  access  groups  with  different  access 
privileges”[17]. 
Rights: the learners have not only needs, but also 
rights.    They  have  the  ownership  of  their 
qualification  attainments,  same  as  paper-based 
certificates.  These are personal data, and the owners 
have  the  right  to  store,  manage,  share  and  track, 
“under their control, with their consent, and for their 
benefit”[18].  
Stakeholder  Trust:  A  fundamental requirement 
from  the  use  cases  is  the  need  to  establish  trust 
amongst stakeholders.  Once more parallels can be 
drawn with PKI systems where trust networks have 
to be engineered in order for any other user to see 
value  in  the  key  certificates  generated.  This  is 
typically achieved either with a hierarchy of globally 
“trusted  nodes  called  Certificate  Authorities”  (CA) 
or by anarchy based methods such as Pretty Good 
Privacy  (PGP)  where  chains  of  trust  are  formed 
between users who already know each other[19]. 
Distributed  Stakeholders:  To  “stimulate  large-
scale uptake” of users[11], eCertificate tools need to 
define  “architecture  of  participation”.  The 
eCertificate system will not work unless there is a 
significant body of universities and employers who 
will accept them.  This concept is defined within the 
Web 2.0 community as the network effects that are 
achieved  when  “Users  Add  Value”  and  encourage 
further users to participate[20]. 
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Figure 2. eCertificate use case diagram 
 
 
4.5. Gap analysis:  
 
Existing  services:  a)  Digital  signing:  digital 
signatures  are  used  in  eDocuments  to  provide 
authentication,  integrity,  and  non-repudiation.    By 
adopting digital signing method, adding an issuer’s 
signature  to  an  eCertificate  can  meet  part  of  the 
eCertificate assertion use case as it can provide proof 
of  the  certificate’s  source  and  evidence  of modification, and it also meet part of the stakeholder 
trust  use case as the  CAs provide chain of trusted 
nodes.   
b)  Service  Orientated  Architecture  (SOA):  By 
adopting the SOA of the eFramework one meets the 
distributed  stakeholder  use  case  as  SOA  provides 
architecture of participation.   
c)  Federated  Identity:  The  formation  of 
stakeholder  trust  has  been  addressed  in  previous 
eFramework  projects, including  ePortfolio projects, 
by  utilizing  the  open-source  federated  identity 
system  Shibboleth[10].  It  would  provide  a 
framework for eCertificate stakeholders to be able to 
lookup and verify the identities of other stakeholders; 
and therefore be able to place trust in their identity. 
However, such systems may need to be extended in 
order  to  associate  the  requirements  of  eCertificate 
system. 
Required  Services:  Current  research is  missing 
services to certify the veracity of any XML structure; 
it isn’t possible to create eCertificates to assert that 
an  XML  fragment  representing  the  qualification  is 
genuine.  Therefore, services are required to address 
the  lifetime  validation,  trust  and  key  management, 
and privacy issues while solving the (eCertificate)
2 
problem. 
 
4.6. Bridging the profile gap 
 
Auto  verification  of  CRLs:  to  solve  the 
(certificate)
2  problem,  we  need  to  validate  the 
certificates’  state  against  two  types  of  certificate 
revocation list (CRL): whether the signer’s key has 
been  compromised  or  the  actual  content  certificate 
has been redrawn.  Therefore we need to maintain 
the document’s revocation list as well as the signer’s 
certificate revocation list (CRL).  We can provide a 
service to automatically verify the status against both 
of these lists, without the need of raise a request by 
the reviewers.   
XML  metadata:  the  ownership,  usage,  and 
privacy issues can be solved by generate the related 
information in XML metadata while employing the 
enveloped and enveloping signature method to create 
an eCertificate; allow the owner to set access control 
to the document while retaining the integrity of the 
digital signature. 
An independent system that provides verification 
service  would  be  an  ideal  to  solve  the  lifetime 
validation issue.  However, it needs to overcome the 
storage and security issues. 
 
4.7. Goals 
 
According  to  the  research  information  and 
analysis result, the eCert system designed is aim to:  
  Maintain  information  privacy,  and  ensure  that 
the  owner  can  have  control  over  the  usage  of 
their eCertificates;  
  Prevent  unauthorized  modifying,  and  could  be 
verified in a legal context;  
  Lifetime  validation,  independent  from  issuing 
body.   
  Allow for verification nationwide;  
  Easy to use while maintain security controls, suit 
low IT skill users, both students and reviewers;  
  Can  be  accessed  through  the  issuing 
organizations, or any owner preferred ePortfolio, 
or be used as a standalone application. 
 
4.8. Structure design 
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Figure3: transmitting eDocuments with a central service 
with no storing approach 
 
The three typical system structures for handling 
digitally  signed  documents,  which  mentioned  in 
section 3, are employed in many existing systems, 
such  as  mobile  eBoarding  cards,  secured  mailing 
systems  and  commercial  eCertificate  systems.  
However, they were designed for specific purposes, 
their  limitations  affect  them  to  be  applied  in  the 
eCertificate situation efficiently. 
For  the  aim  of  meeting  the  eCertificate 
requirements,  a  new  system  structure  design  is 
proposed  as  the  base  of  the  eCertificate  system 
framework:  a  centralized  service  approach  for 
distributed eCertificates, this is show in Figure 3. 
 
  a central online system provide the management 
and  verification  service  for  all  joined 
institutions;  
  all institutions issue eCertificate under the same 
standard independently, and then issue them to 
the owners;  
  the  owners  can  access  the  online  management 
system  to  set  access  control  of  their  own 
eCertificate before sending out to the reviewers;  
  the  reviewers  access  the  online  verification 
system  to  verify  the  eCertificate  with  the 
received access information;  
 Compare  to  the  other  structures  that  mentioned 
earlier,  this  new  system  structure  combines  their 
advantages,  provides  convenience  access  point, 
while  employ  eDocument  distribution  approach, 
which will not only satisfy the ownership right, but 
could  also  save  huge  system  storage  and  avoid 
database attacks dramatically. 
However,  with  this  approach,  we  back  to  our 
three way transmitting situation, and need to address 
the  keys  management,  privacy  and  confidentiality 
issues that we described earlier. 
 
4.9. System design 
 
As  a  result,  the  eCert  system  was  designed  to 
contain  three  subsystems  for  issuing,  management, 
and verification services[21], showed in Figure4: 
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Figure4. eCert system design overview 
 
The eCert issuing subsystem will create and issue 
eCertificates.    An  eCertificate  may  contain  three 
sections  where  applicable:  an  electronic  version  of 
the award qualification certificate; the transit file of 
the supported information about the qualification and 
the organization; and the skill assessment file that the 
certification was based on.  The eCertificate will be 
digitally  signed  and  encrypted  to  ensure  assertion 
and prevent unauthorized access; it will also contain 
build-in  functions  to  allow  usage  control  settings 
while  maintain  the  integrity  of  the  digital  signing.  
This is shown Figure5. 
The eCert management subsystem will be access 
controlled.  It will enable the eCertificate owners to 
view and set control to their own eCertificates, e.g. 
who can see what (which sections) and for how long 
and  hence  produce  specific  views  for  specified 
reviewers within specified time. 
The  eCert  verification  subsystem  will  take 
eCertificates and their co-responding access keys as 
input,  using  their  decrypted  data  and  build  in 
functions to verify the state of the signers’ public key 
certificates  and  the  award  qualification  certificates 
(whether  they  have  been  revolved);  validate  the 
award expire time and access expire time; verify the 
digital  signature  against  content  modification;  and 
display the file when successfully pass all the above 
processes. 
The  eCert  issuing  subsystem  is  for  registered 
educational  organizations  only.    The  management 
subsystem  and  verification  subsystem  will  be 
provided through the eCert online central system.   
 
Figure5. The interface design of a verified eCertificate 
 
4.10.  System policy  
 
In  order  to  secure  such  a  system,  a  number  of 
decisions and assumptions have been taken: 
  every student will register a unique student ID 
when they start study at sixth form or college 
(the level that they will start to receive all 
sources of qualification certificates);  
  This registration process will verify who the 
student is (same process as register to a course at 
college), and assign each student with an unique 
student ID nationwide 
  This student ID will last lifelong 
  Every eCertificate that the student achieved will 
contain this student ID along with the 
eCertificate ID as prove of ownership  
  Student : student id  1 : 1 
  Student id : eCert id  1 : many 
  All eCertificates will be digitally signed with 
eCert signing method and then encrypted before 
issue 
  All institutions that would like to use the system 
to issue eCertificates will need to be certified first, ideally by a professional education body, 
e.g. the Ministry of Education, so that no fake 
institutions can be involved.  All members that 
represent their institution, e.g. a registrar, will 
also need to be certified, and can be traced back 
to the institution.   
  To ensure that only the eCertificate owner can 
change the access value to their own 
eCertificates but not anyone else, a login access 
control to the management subsystem is 
required.  
  only authorized issuer from the registered 
education institution can access the issuing 
system.   
  As every institution will have difference 
attribute names in database tables, and may 
using different methods to collect the required 
information when forming a paper-based 
certificate; with the purpose of easy fit the eCert 
system into any institution, the eCert system will 
let the institution to form the base of the award 
qualification file using the existing method, and 
take over from a print-ready for paper-based 
certificate stage, and from that, set links to 
collect any required information.  This should 
simplify the configuration on system setup when 
install.  
 
4.11.  Advantages  
 
Compared  with  the  other  methods,  approaches, 
and existing systems, the eCert system offers huge 
advantages [22]: 
Ownership:  the  eCert  system  is  designed  with 
user  centric  approach,  the  eCertificate  is  in  the 
owner’s hand, and the owner has full control of it.  
E.g. owner can set access control to an eCertificate, 
and  it  can  be  stored  to  the  owner’s  preferred 
repositories  while  still  maintaining  verification 
functions;  
Technical: the system contain functions to handle 
the (eCertificate)
2 and the auto validation problems; 
also allowing setting for usage control  while could 
still  be  verified  against  the  initial  issuer’s  digital 
signature. 
Usage: provides a single access point, convenient 
access for learners and reviewers with eCertificates 
that have been issued from a wide range of register 
educational organizations; 
Lifetime  validation:  an  eCertificate  can  be 
verified  independently  without  referring  to  the 
issuing  institution,  the  central  system  provides  the 
required  services  for  any  issued  eCertificates  even 
when the issuing institution no longer exists.  
System  storage:  the  system  doesn’t  store  any 
eCertificates copies or sensitive data in the system, 
while providing all the required services through a 
secured  environment.    It  minimizes  the  required 
storage.  This becomes increasingly significant as the 
system grows in  size, especially  when its  usage is 
nationwide, and the eCertificates need to last for life 
Security: as our sensitive data are not stored in 
the system, and there is no traffic raised against any 
organizations’  database  due  to  the  verification 
process, we can avoid many of the potential attacks;  
Trust: the central system is only there to provide 
a service, as our sensitive data are not stored in the 
system, there will be no risk of our data being lost.  
Regarding  people  in  general,  who  don’t  trust 
government bodies to hold their personal data, this 
approach  makes  having  such  a  central  system 
possible.  
 
4.12.  System implementation 
 
The  design  has  been  implemented  in  order  to 
demonstrate its technical correctness. 
The system is implemented in two parts: a code 
library and a demonstrator.  The identified  service 
profile and the selected techniques from gap analysis 
and gap bridging stages are used for the code library 
to  base  a  reference  implementation,  ready  to 
integrate within a Service Oriented Architecture.  A 
demonstrator  is  produced  to  represent  the  whole 
framework  design  that  supported  by  the  library 
functions.   
Code  library:  The  core  of  eCert  system 
implementation  is  a  open  source  code  library, 
providing  basic  supports  for  the  eCert  issuing, 
management,  and  verification  system  development. 
The  code  library  is  built  in  Java,  with  the 
programming environment of J2SE 1.6.  The eCert 
code library includes a number of features that meets 
the  requirements  of  the  eCert  demonstrator 
development: 
  Support for digitally signing XML documents 
with the eCert signing method, compatible with 
ESTI European Digital Signature standard. 
  Support for digitally-signing and verifying files 
with given key stores. 
  Support for Key Pair generating (variant 
lengths), converting (from/to String) and file 
encryption/decryption with RSA/DSA 
algorithm. 
  Support for domain file processing, including 
producing qualification files, adding file 
metadata, setting access control, multiple 
digitally signing prepared files, file compression 
and decompression, and fully verifying signed 
qualification files. 
Demonstrator: A web interface demonstrator has 
been  produced  on  top  of  the  code  library.    The 
system  is  developed  in  MyEclipse  Enterprise 
Workbench  8.5,  and  implemented  using  JSP, 
JavaScript (jQuery), and MySQL for database.  The 
website provides the user interface for the issuing, 
management, and verification systems, with calls to 
the  code  library  for  functional  supports.    All  web 
pages share a common interface design for system consistent,  with  different  colour  scheme  to 
distinguish the three systems in between.  Different 
pages are rendered by loading different sub-pages in 
the  menu  and  content  areas  using  the  Ajax 
technologies. 
 
5.  eCert evaluation 
 
The  eCert  solution  has  been  evaluated  in  three 
steps:  
  Whether the design meets the requirement 
  The  usage  of  the  eCert  system  in  its  related 
applications 
  The applicability of the eCert concept in other 
eDocument transmitting domains 
 
5.1. eCert system design evaluation 
 
The  eCert  used  a  mixed-model  research 
methodology:  the  Delphi  methodology[23]  was 
employed for the evaluation of eCert system design 
alongside the SORM development methodology, to 
determine  whether  the  design  meets  the 
requirements,  step  by  step  throughout  the 
development stages.  Following this method, a group 
of domain experts in the UK were selected for the 
purpose of security system design, ePortfolio study, 
and  represent  of  the  stakeholders.   These  included 
employment  managers,  IT  security  experts,  exam 
board  managers,  and  ePortfolio  researchers.    Two 
workshops have been run during two stages of the 
development  to  collect  the  professional  opinions 
from  these  experts:  one  at  the  end  of  the  system 
design  stage,  aiming  to  evaluate  and  adjust  the 
system from the strategic level; and the other one on 
demo  completion  stage,  where  the  system  was 
brought back to the domain experts after the design 
adjustments and demonstrator production, aiming to 
evaluate the system from the technical level. 
In  addition  to  following  the  Delphi  method, 
workshops and presentations have also taken place in 
national and international computing security related 
conferences  to  collect  the  opinions  from  a  wider 
range of domain experts, such as a “round table” run 
at the EdMedia 2010 conference at Toronto, Canada 
[24].  
After each round, feedback was reflected, and as a 
result,  the  system  (including  the  design,  demo, 
documentation,  and  reports)  were  adjusted 
accordingly.  For example 
  the  eCert  file  structure  now  includes  the 
transcript file to enhance its usage nationwide;  
  a photo of the student can now be added as one 
of  the  evidence  files  and  bound  with  the 
eCertificate to enhance the security, but optional 
when preferred for the sake of privacy;  
  more work has been spent on system comparing 
between  the  new  design  and  the  existing 
systems,    and  the  explanation  of  the  chosen 
approach  are given in more detail. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  project,  much  positive 
feedback  has  been  received  from  conferences  and 
workshops  internationally  while  negative  feedback 
was mainly related to the future work that can’t be 
completed  in  the  current  project.    Joe  Wilson[25], 
one of the workshop participants, wrote on his blog: 
“…  Some  really  useful  example  uses  from  across 
UK…  can  be  used  to  verify  exam  results,  project 
work, ePortfolios. … can see lots of applications for 
this.  Potentially useful links to Bologna process and 
E-Certification E-pass work”. 
 
5.2. eCert system usage evaluation 
 
With the eCert system design successfully passed 
the  evaluation  process  through  the  Delphi  method, 
the  usage  of  the  eCert  system  is  then  evaluated 
through  a  subproject  named  “Integrating 
eCertificates  within  ePortfolio  Systems”,  to  test 
whether it could  not only be used  as a  standalone 
application, but could also be serviced within other 
related applications, such as ePortfolios.   
The  evaluation  subproject  was  carried  out  by  a 
group  of  four  Masters  degree  computer  science 
students.   
The group has explicitly produced a working web 
service  (or  Application  Programming  Interface  - 
API)  to  be  positioned  above  the  code  base  and 
provide  public-facing  methods  for  eCertificate 
verification.  Methods  have  also  been  provided  to 
allow  the  downloading  of  transcript  and  evidence 
files,  and  the  modification  of  their  access  and 
visibility parameters. 
In  addition  to  this,  the  group  has  developed 
mechanisms  for  eCertificate  integration  within  the 
University  of  Southampton’s  home-brewed 
ePortfolio system, “eFolio”, and an Australian open-
source ePortfolio system, “Mahara”.  Both systems 
can now be fully utilised by those with eCertificate 
qualifications.  
The group has completed all of its primary and 
secondary goals.  As a result, it proves the usage of 
the system successfully as the eCert system can not 
only be used standalone but can also be plugged into 
other  applications.    In  return,  the  eCert  system’s 
accessibility and scalability have also been improved 
after taking a considerable number of observations 
and recommendations from this subproject. 
 
5.3. eCert concept evaluation 
 
The  aim  of  the  research  is  to  explore  the 
eDocument  transmitting  issues,  propose  a  solution 
for a secured eDocument transmitting framework, so 
that  the  securely  transmitted  eDocument  could  be 
verified in a legal context, and valid lifetime, while 
the owner can remain control over its usage. As the 
case  of  eCertificate  study  represents  the  typical eDocument transmitting issues, it is believed that the 
concept  of  its  solution  could  in  turn  solve  the 
eDocument  transmitting  issues  in  other  cases.  
Therefore, with the aim of proving this hypothesis, 
and to evaluate the applicability of the eCert protocol 
in a wider context, the concept of the eCert solution 
is  being  tested  under  a  further  subproject,  Mobile 
eID.    Mobile  eID  explores  the  issues  that  arise  in 
implementing  the  eCert  protocol  within  a  mobile 
platform,  which  provide  protected  and  certifiable 
electronic identity (eID) information through mobile 
devices. 
Consider the following situation:  young looking 
Bob goes out clubbing and often has to certify his 
age to enter. By presenting his paper ID, his is forced 
to  disclose  all  the  sensitive  information  on  that 
document, not only the age. Unfortunately he left the 
required ID document at home, and even though his 
wallet contains a lot of other ID cards, nothing else is 
acceptable.  Disconsolate,  Bob  comes  back  home. 
The idea of this subproject was to apply the eCert 
technique,  present  an  ID  documents  as  digitally 
signed,  owner  controlled  ID  certificates  through 
mobile  devices.    The  eCert  for  eID  managed  in 
mobile devices proved itself as the tool able to be 
always available and to provide a huge variety of ID 
in order to avoid the previous scenario.  
The  Mobile  eID  project  has  exploited  the 
underlying  technologies,  studied  the  current  ID 
system, compared the eCert with the analysis of the 
eID  problem  domain,  and  thereby  derived  a  new 
working solution for a mobile Android environment 
managed by the eCert protocol.  More importantly, 
the  user-centric  approach  of  eCert  also  allows  the 
eID owner to personally manage the ID information 
and to display only what is required.  However, since 
the eCert system is implemented particularly for e-
qualification  certificates,  a  reverse  engineering 
process to adapt the eCert system is required during 
the mobile eID system development. 
As  a  result,  the  successful  outcome  of  this 
subproject  proved  that  the  concept  of  the  eCert 
protocol  could  be  the  answer  for  the  eDocument 
transmitting issues in other related domains.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The  eCert  project,  as  a  case  study,  has 
successfully proposed a solution for a user-centric, 
secured  eCertificate  management  system.    It  has 
addressed  the  (eCertificate)
2  problem  that  exists 
within the traditional digital signing method when it 
is  applied  to  non  static  content  eDocuments;  it 
defined  the  eCertificate  file  structure,    so  that  it 
contains  not  only  the  qualification  award 
information, but also the transcript information and 
any supported evidence files,  which can be in any 
format; it has proposed a new digital signing method 
to cooperate with the designed file structure and to 
meet  the  eDocuments’  ownership  right.    The  new 
signing  method  not  only  bound  the  related  files 
together, but also allow the eCertificate owners to set 
access  control  value  of  who  can  see  what  and  for 
how long to the signed eDocument, while remaining 
the integrity of the signature, without the need of re-
signing  by  the  initial  issuing  body;  an  additional 
encrypt key will be added after the signing to ensure 
that  only  the  receiver  with  the  corresponding 
decryption  key  can  access  the  file;  it  has  also 
proposed  a  newly  designed  centralized  verification 
service  for  such  digitally  signed  and  access 
controlled  distributed  eCertificates.    The  system 
provides  security  control  for  verification  against 
eCertificate  expire  time,  access  period,  ownership, 
signing key status, qualification award status, owner 
controlled section display.  The whole design worked 
together  to  ensure  the  issued  eCertificates  can  be 
securely distributed and verified independently from 
the  issuing  body  and  satisfy  the  ownership  right, 
without requiring storage in the verification system.  
This  also  provides  huge  advantages  of  lifetime 
validation  and  the  avoidance  of  many  database 
attacks.  
The  protocol  has  been  tested  and  evaluated 
through  its  demonstrator  following  the  selected 
research methodology; the design principle has been 
tested  through  a  subproject,  integrating  eCert  in 
ePortfolios, to evaluate the usage of eCertificate in 
other applications; the concept of the eCert solution 
has been tested through a subproject, the Mobile eID, 
to evaluate the applicability of such concept in wider 
situations.    All  the  test  and  evaluation  results  are 
successful, indicated that the proposed eCert protocol 
will not only meet the eCertificate challenge, but also 
solve  the  eDocument  transmitting  security  issues, 
and can be applied in a wider domain.  
As the eCert demo is just there to demonstrate the 
eCert  concept  and  design,  it  only  uses  self  signed 
certificates  and  a  dummy  database  throughout  the 
system development and testing.  Future work can be 
to  investigate  and  evaluate  the  eCert  system  by 
employing  real  CAs  and  linking  to  real  institution 
databases  for  further  testing,  and  adding  more 
functions  to  improve  the  system’s  user  interface 
when  the  system  is  going  to  be  used  in  the  real 
world. 
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